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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of lJtah 
JOSEPH M. PERKINS and 
) ESTHER J. PERKINS, Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
CASE 
vs. ,' NO. 7565 ! 
RICHARD L. SPENCER and ) GRACE N. SPENCER, Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
To plaintiffs' and appellants' Statement of Facts should 
be added the following additional statement: 
The contract attached Exhibit "A" carries the follow-
ing provision: 
"THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this 18th 
day of May, A.D., 1949, by and between Richard L. 
Spencer and Grace N. Spencer, his wife, hereinafter 
designated as the Seller, and Joseph M. Perkins and 
Esther J. Perkins, his wife, as joint tenants according 
to the rules of the common law and not as tenants in 
common, and to the survivor of such, hereinafter des-
ignated as the Buyer, of Provo, Utah . . . . ." 
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2 
The contract attached Exhibit "A" is signed by Rich-
ard L. Spencer, Grace N. Spencer, as sellers, and Joseph 
M. Perkins and Esther J. Perkins as buyers. 
The contract attached Exhibit "A" carries the follow-
ing provision: 
"It is understood between the parties, however, 
that the entire balance shall become due and payable 
when the home presently owned by Joseph M. Perkins 
and Esther J. Perkins, his wife, located in Bountiful, 
Utah, is sold." 
The property sold under the contract constituted the 
home of defendants and respondents, and at the time of 
the negotiations and the making of the contract, the de-
fendants and respondents occupied the premises as their 
home. The plaintiffs and appellants knew of this fact and 
understood that the defendants and respondents would have 
to procure another home for themselves. The defendants 
and respondents purchased another home and made a pay-
ment of $5,619.67 and assumed a first mortgage indebted-
ness in the amount of $4,376.83, payable at the rate of 
$47.50 per month. They moved from the property in ques-
tion to their new purchase on or about June 1, 1949. (Mem-
orandum Decision, Pages 1 and 2). 
The last payment made by the plaintiffs and appellants 
was on date of August 25, 1949, and the Bountiful property 
was sold about September 17, 1949. The plaintiffs' and ap-
p2llants' application for an F. H. A. loan through the First 
Se2urity Bank of Provo had been accepted so that as of the 
date when the sale was to have been consummated, the 
plaintiffs and appellants, by virtue of what had been paid 
in and what had been received by the sale of the Bountiful 
property and the approved F. H. A. loan, had an amount 
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more than sufficient to satisfy the demands of the con-
tract, but plaintiffs and appellants failed to make any pay-
ment to the defendants and respondents after the sale of 
the Bountiful property, nor did they vacate the property. 
(Memorandum Decision, Pages 2 and 3). 
The notice of November 3, 1949, was served on both 
of the plaintiffs and appellants and notified them that they 
were delinquent upon their contract in the amount of the 
balance due of $7,940.10, and that unless they paid the de-
linquency within five days, "the undersigned, in accordance 
with the terms and conditions of said contract, shall be 
released from all obligations in law and equity, to convey 
the said property, and all payments which have been made 
by you heretofore on said contract to the undersigned, shall 
be forfeited to the undersigned as liquidated damages for 
the non-performance of the said contract and you will there-
upon become forthwith tenants at will of the undersigned 
and action will be commenced against you for recovery of 
the immediate possession of said premises." (Memorandum 
Decision, Page 3). 
That at the time of the service of the notice of No-
vember 9, 1949, upon Esther J. Perkins, the plaintiff, 
Joseph M. Perkins, was not at home, but was working in 
Carbon County. (Memorandum Decision, Page 4). 
ARGUMENT 
Counsel for plaintiffs and appellants, in their brief, has 
set up under the heading of "Plaintiffs' Points," (page 4 
of Appellants' Brief) , two principal grounds. The issues 
raised by the statements of plaintiffs' and appellants' 
points are as follows: 
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Point I 
Did the trial court err in assessing $532.50 damages by 
reason of the unlawful detainer of the said Esther J. Perkins 
and in holding the plaintiff, Esther J. Perkins, guilty of 
unlawful detainer? 
Point II 
Did the trial court err in holding the forfeiture provi-
sion of the contract was not a penalty? 
POINT I 
DID THE TRIAL COiURT ERR IN ASSESSING 
$532.50 DAMAGE BY REASON OF THE UNLAWF1JL 
DETAINER OF THE SAID ESTHER J. PERKINS AND 
IN HOLDING THE PLAINTIFF, ESTHER J. PERKINS, 
GUILTY OF UNLAWFUL DETAINER? 
Counsel for plaintiffs and appellants assumes that the 
only tenant is Joseph M. Perkins and from this, reasons 
that the only one who could be guilty of unlawful detainer 
would be Joseph M. Perkins. The point is overlooked that 
Esther J. Perkins was also a tenant at will and that she 
was properly notified to vacate the premises and the judg-
ment is for damages as to her unlawful detainer. The 
question here is not that of damages as against Joseph M. 
Perkins, but is a question of damages as to tenant Esther J. 
Perkins. 
The contract runs in favor of Joseph M. Perkins and 
Esther J. Perkins and is signed by Joseph M. Perkins and 
Esther, J. Perkins as buyers. (See Contract, Exhibit "A"). 
48 Corpus Juris Secundum, page 927, paragraph 4, con-
tains the following statement: 
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"A joint tenancy may be terminated or severed by 
any act which destroys one or more of its unities. Thus 
a joint tenancy may be severed by the act of one or 
less than all of the co-tenants in conveying or other-
wise disposing of their interests, as this destroys the 
unity of title and creates a severance as to such inter-
ests, as where one joint tenant assigns, mortgages or 
pledges, or leases his interest." 
Swartzbaugh v. Sampson, 54 P2d 73, 11 Cal. App. 2d, 
451 states: 
"An estate in joint tenancy can be severed by de .. 
straying one or more of the necessary unities, either 
by operation of law, by death, by voluntary or certain 
involuntary acts of the joint tenants, or by certain acts 
or omissions of one joint tenant without the consent 
of the other." 
Here the two tenants had violated the provisions of 
their contract and had been notified that their rights under 
the contract were forfeited and that henceforth they would 
be treated as tenants at will. 
The notice that was later served on Esther J. Perkins, 
demanding possession of the premises, did, after the lapse 
of the five-day period, serve to sever the tenancy and it 
would seem to follow that when Esther J. Perkins remained 
in possession, that an action for unlawful detainer against 
her would be good even though such an action might not 
lie as against other persons. 
Counsel for plaintiffs and appellants argues that, the 
failure of tenant, Esther J. Perkins, to move out of the 
house did not cause the Spencers any damage. The facts 
show that Esther J. Perkins was in actual possession and 
that plaintiff, Joseph M. Perkins, was not at home, but 
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was working in another county. The argument assumes 
that Joseph M. Perkins was staying in possession, but ac- · 
tually he was in another county. 
32 American Jurisprudence, page 778, paragraph 918, 
contains the following language: 
"Since a tenant is under duty, it being a covenant 
express or implied in all leases, to deliver up the prem-
ises to the landlord on the termination of a lease, the 
tenant can hold over rightfully only pursuant to a 
valid agreement with the landlord. Holding over by 
the tenant without such agreement of the landlord puts 
the tenant in the position of being in wrongful posses-
sion against the landlord. He is a wrongdoer." 
The tenant, Esther J. Perkins, by her holding posses-
sion after the lapse of the time set forth in the notice of 
November 9, 1949, is a wrongdoer. Her liability for dam-
ages as a result of her wrongful act is not affected by the 
fact that there may be other wrongdoers. As far as is 
apparent to the defendants and respondents, she is the 
only one in physical possession. Certainly, it can be as-
sumed that as soon as Esther J. Perkins was ousted from 
possession, her joint tenant would have no desire to remain 
in possession, especially when he was not physically present. 
The measure of damages set out by Forrester v. Cook, 
292 P. 206, 77 Utah 137, is the rental value of the land, 
not as rent, but as damages which, under the unlawful 
detainer statute, is multifplied by three. Esther J. Perkins, 
by virtue of her interest in the contract and her retention 
of possession after due and proper notice, is an unlawful 
detainer and it would seem to follow that the application 
of the unlawful detainer statute, U. C. A., 1943, Title 104-
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60-13, and the principles set out in Forrester v. Cook, 292 
P. 206, 77 Utah 137, would require a finding of damages 
in the amount of $532.50 as against Esther J. Perkins. 
POINT II 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN HOLDING THE 
FORFEITURE PROVISION OF THE CONTRACT WAS 
NOT A PENALTY? 
The Courts, in determining whether a provision in a 
contract is one calling for damages or a penalty, have rea-
soned on the basis set out in the following statements of 
the law: 
Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. 1, page 819, 
Section 440, answers the query as follows: 
"The question whether a sum thus stipulated to 
be paid is a penalty or is liquidated damages, is often 
difficult to determine. It depends, however, upon a 
construction of the whole instrument, upon the real 
intention of the parties as ascertained from all the lan-
guage which they have used, from the nature of the act 
to be performed or not to be performed, from the con-
sequences which naturally result from a violation of 
the contract, and from the circumstances generally 
surrounding the transaction." 
Williston on Contracts, Revised Edition, Vol. 3, Sec. 
777, page 2185-6, on question of intention, states: 
"Probably all that most Courts mean-at any rate 
all that can be defended-is to say that the validity of 
the stipulation is to be 'judged of as at the time of 
making of the contract, not as at the time of the 
breach,' and this is undoubtedly true." 
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Williston on Contracts, Revised Edition, Vol. 3, Sec. 
783, page 2203-4, notes: 
"Though the mere fact that, as it turns out, the 
sum named exceeds the actual damage will not make 
it a penalty, since the reasonableness of the provision 
must be considered as of the date of the contract. ... " 
Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. 1, Sec. 385, page 
714, states: 
"The meaning is that whatever be the nature of the 
controversy between two definite parties, and whatever 
be the nature of the remedy demanded, the Court will 
not confer its equitable relief upon the parties seeking 
its interposition and aid, unless he has acknowledged 
and conceded, or will admit and provide for all the 
equitable rights, claims and demands justly belonging 
to the adversary party, and growing out of or neces-
sarily involved in the subject matter of the contro-
versy." 
A consideration of the cases, including those relied on 
by counsel for the plaintiffs and appellants, indicates that 
what we have here is a damage provision and not one for 
a penalty. 
Counsel for plaintiffs and appellants, in an effort to 
sustain Point Two, relies in the main on the cases of Dopp 
v. Richards, 43 U. 332, 135 P. 98, Western Macaroni Mfg. 
v. Fiore, 47 U. 108, 151 P. 984, Cooley v. Call, __ u. __ , 
211 P. 977, and Croft v. Jensen, 86 U. 13, 40 P2d 198. 
A reading of the case of Dopp v. Richards, 43 U. 332, 
135 P. 98, shows facts which are in no way applicable to 
the facts in the present case. Plaintiff, in that case, sought 
to recover damages commensurate with his claimed loss in 
addition to the payments that had actually been made, 
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notwithstanding the provision in the contract providing that 
the vendees should forfeit to the vendors as liquidated 
damages, all payments that had been made on the agree-
ment. The Utah Supreme Court, in that case, held that 
the provision for liquidated damages of the amounts paid 
limited any recovery which plaintiff might have to amounts 
actually paid, even though it might be far less than the 
actual damages. 
Counsel for plaintiffs and appellants places consider-
able reliance on the case of Western Macaroni Mfg. v. Fiore, 
47 U. 108, 151 P. 984. We submit that the principles set 
out in this case have no application to the instant case. In 
the Western Macaroni Mfg. v. Fiore case, the covenants 
were of equal importance and covered unrelated subject 
matter. There are numerous cases dealing with the type 
of contract that we have in the instant case, but in none 
of these cases does he Court apply the reasoning of the 
Western Macaroni case. The Cooley v. Call, __ u._, 
211 P. 977, case involved a contract containing different 
covenants. In fact, one of the covenants in the Cooley v. 
Call case was for the payment of taxes and assessments, 
and one for payments on purchase price, just as two of the 
covenants in the instant case are to pay taxes and assess-
ments and payments on purchase price. The Court in the 
Cooley v. Call case reasoned that the intent of the parties 
was that the provision was one for liquidated damages. 
We submit the same reasoning would apply here. In the 
instant case, the paramount covenant is one of payment. 
The different covenants referred to by the buyer all tie 
in to the main covenant of payment. 
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The principal is well stated in Pomeroy's Equity Juris-
prudence, Volume 1, in the note under Section 443, at pages 
842 and 843 as follows: 
"The mere fact, however, that an agreement con-
tains two or more provisions differing in kind and im-
portance does not of itself necessarily bring it within 
the operation of this rule. If the various acts stipu-
lated to be done are but minor parts of one single 
whole-steps in the accomplishment of one single end 
-so that the contract is in reality one, then it may 
properly come under the operation of the second rule 
as given in the text." 
The second rule as given in the text is found in Pome-
roy's Equity Jurisprudence, Volume 1, Section 442 at page 
829: 
"Second. Where an agreement is for the perform-
ance or non-performance of only one act, and there is 
no adequate means of ascertaining the precise damage 
which may result from a violation, the parties may, 
if they please, by a separate clause of the contract, 
fix upon the amount of compensation payable by the 
defaulting party in case of a breach; and a stipulation 
inserted for such purpose will be treated as one for 
liquidated damages unless the intent be clear that it 
was designed to be only a penalty." 
In the case of Cooley v. Call, __ u. __ , 211 P. 977, 
the contract price was $8,450.00, payable as follows: 
$1,850.00 upon execution of the contract; $1,000.00 Decem-
ber 1, 1920; $1,000.00 December 1, 1921, and the assump-
tion of two mortgages aggregating $4,600.00, and agree-
ment to pay taxes thereafter levied. The Court found that 
the buyers had paid $2,130.00, or approximately 25.2% of 
the purchase price. The action, in that case, was brought 
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by the sellers of the land, seeking specific performance of 
the contract. The Court held that the forfeiture provision 
was intended by the parties as one for liquidated damages 
and so denied the right of the owners to specific perform-
ance. 
We submit that on the basis of the test used in the 
case of Cooley v. Call, _u._, 211 P. 977, the percent 
of payment is approximately the same as in our instant 
case, and that the reasoning of the Court as to the length 
of time before final payment would be made, would apply 
with equal force in the instant case. 
In the instant case, the time of the final payment was 
indefinite, in that it was to be paid when the Bountiful 
property was sold. It could be years before this payment 
would have been due so that the Court could very well 
find that the provision as to liquidated damages was cer-
tainly intended by the parties as liquidated damages. 
There is another fact in the instant case that does not 
appear in the Cooley v. Call case, and that is that it was 
known to the plaintiffs and appellants, as buyers, that the 
defendants and respondents would have to procure another 
home for themselves before the plaintiffs and appellants 
could take possession. In order to obtain a home for thern·· 
selves, the defendants and respondents purchased property 
by paying $5,619.67 and by assuming a first mortgage ill-
debtedness upon the property in the sum of $4,376.83, pay-
able at the rate of $47.50 per month. They moved frorn 
the property in question to their new purchase on or about 
June 1, 1949. In other words, the defendants and re-
spondents gave up the home they were living in, obligated 
themselves on a contract and assumed a further mortgage 
obligation. They did not contemplate being placed in a 
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~andlord-tenant relationship at the time of the execution 
of the contract, so that it can be said in this case, as the 
Supreme Court said in the Cooley v. Call case, t~1at the 
obvious intention of the parties, considered in the light of 
what the parties must have foreseen and contemplated at 
the time the contract was executed, was that the provision 
was one for liquidated damages. 
The facts in the case of Croft v. Jensen, 86 U. 13, 40 
P2d 198, are clearly inapplicable to the facts in the instant 
case. The sale price of the property involved in the Croft 
v. Jensen case was $6,500.00. A down payment was made 
of $4,200.00, represented by $200.0 cash and property con-
veyed to vendor valued at $4,000.00. The contract con-
tained a clause similar to the clause in the present case. 
The facts of that case disclose that on July 17, 1925, the 
plaintiffs served a written notice on the defendant, Jensen, 
informing him that plaintiffs had terminated the contract 
for the sale of the property. A similar notice was sent by 
registered mail on the same day to defendant I. G. Bench. 
The sum of $200.00 remained unpaid at the time. A few 
days after the notice was given I. G. Bench, he tendered to 
the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs' attorney the sum of $200.00 
and demanded a deed to the property. The tender of the 
payment of $200.00 was refused. 
The facts further show that at the trial the defendant 
again tendered the balance in the amount of $200.00. The 
Utah Supreme Court, in the case of Croft v. Jensen, made 
this observation: 
"It will be observed that at the time the plaintiff 
attempted to declare a forfeiture, she had been paid 
the whole of the purchase price of the property except 
$200.00, which sum was tendered to her and was by 
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her refused prior to the time she commenced this ac-
tion." (Bottom of page 201 and top of page 202, 40 
P2d 198) 
The Court further observed: 
"To permit plaintiff to retain $6,300.00 as liqui-
dated damages because she was not promptly paid two 
installments when there was only $200.00 remaining 
unpaid on the contract, is not in accord with equity 
and good conscience, but is clearly unconscienable." 
(Bottom of page 202 under Sub-head 3, 40 P2d 198) 
The facts in the instant case are not at all similar to 
the Croft v. Jensen case. In the instant case, plaintiffs 
and appellants paid the down payment of $2,500.00 and 
three of the $75.00 per month installments, making a total 
paid by them of $2,725.00, or approximately 25.9% of the 
purchase price. At the time of the execution of the con-
tract, the amount paid down was 23.8% of the purchase 
price. In the Croft v. Jensen case, the amount paid in at 
the time of the forfeiture, was in excess of 96% and the 
amount paid at the time of the execution of the contract 
was 64.4~ of the pruchase price. 
In the case now before the Court, there is no evidence 
that there was ever a tender of payment made by the 
buyers. In the Croft v. Jensen case, tender of payment 
was made repeatedly. Further, in the instant case, the 
facts show that the sellers, the respondents herein, in their 
notice of November 3, 1949, gave the buyers an oppor-
tunity to pay the delinquency within five days. Payment 
was not made. In the Croft v. Jensen case, there was 
never any offer permitting the buyers to pay up the de-
linquency. · 
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The Courts quite frequently, as the Court did in the 
Croft v. Jensen case, state that whether an agreement ls 
for liquidated damages or for penalty must be determined 
by a consideration of the circumstances surrounding the 
parties at the time of its execution. However, it is sub-
mitted that the Court in its decision in the Croft v. Jensen 
case, based its decision on the lack of equity in the case 
as shown by the Court's statement as follows: 
"To permit plaintiff to retain $6,300.00 as liqui-
dated damages because she was not promptly paid two 
installments when there was only $200.00 remaining 
unpaid on the contract, is not in accord with equity 
and good conscience, but is clearly unconscienable." 
(Bottom of page 202 under Sub-head 3, 40 P2d 198) 
In the case of Franz v. Hair, 76 U. 281, 289 P. 130, 
the down payment on the purchase price was in excess of 
30%. The Court did not treat it as a penalty. In the 
instant case, payment made was approximately 25.9% and 
the buyer was in possession of the premises for eight 
months, the last five months of which no payment was 
made. 
The reasoning of the Croft v. Jensen case was followed 
in Rayfield v. Van Meter, 52 P. 666, an action to replevy 
furniture sold to defendant. Sale price, $1830.00; $1,000.00 
down payment, balance $850.00 not paid. Claim of fraud. 
The Court said: (See page 667, 52 P. 666) 
"It is contended that in equity the defendant should 
recover the sum paid less a proper compensation for 
the use had by him of the goods. But the grounds for 
equitable relief against the contract pleaded by the 
defendant were found against him by the Court and 
he stands in the position of one who wilfully refused 
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to comply with his agreement. It seems to us that 
there is little equity and certainly no sound policy in 
allowing a buyer, under such circumstances, to be at 
pleasure to quit his contract with no other liability 
than such as the law would have implied had there 
been no express contract at all." 
In the instant case, defendants and respondents never 
interfered with the contract. Plaintiffs and appellants quit. 
There was nothing in the agreement that was harsh. The 
price was fair. Plaintiffs and appellants occupied the prem-
ises for eight months, the last five without making any pay-
ments. Payment has not been tendered and this is so even 
after plaintiffs and appellants were given an opportunity 
to make payment. No payment was made even after the 
Bountiful property was sold. Defendants and respondents, 
in reliance on sale, purchased other property and obligated 
themselves. 
From the foregoing facts, in the instant case the equi-
ties certainly seem to be with the defendants and re-
spondents. 
We respectfully submit that under the principles set 
forth in the cases adjudicated by the Utah Supreme Court 
and other courts, the trial court did not err: 
(1) In assessing $532.50 damages by reason of the un-
lawful detainer of the said Esther J. Perkins and in holding 
the plaintiff Esther J. Perkins guilty of unlawful detainer; 
and 
(2)In holding the forfeiture provision of the contract 
was not a penalty. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HUGH VERN \VENTZ, 
Attorney for Defendants 
and Respondents 
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